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The Proof is in the Pudding
On the Necessity of Presupposition in Marx’s Critical 
Method
Elena Louisa Lange
Abstract: Marx’s labour theory of value cannot be understood without the criti-
que of the value theories of classical political economy, especially that of Adam 
Smith and David Ricardo. It is therefore by necessity inflicted with the presuppo-
sition of its own intellectual context. Presupposition however is not only central 
to the formation of the labour theory of value as «analogous to Newton’s Laws 
in mechanics» (Duncan Foley) in the realm of social science. Presupposition, a 
strong Hegelian topos, also basically informs the level of Marx’s critique as the 
critique of the forms, and hence, the fetish-character of value, as they appear 
within the bourgeois economic horizon. However, it is precisely the unfolding of 
the presuppositions of «simple exchange», «money», «profit» etc. that puts Marx’s 
method in contrast to the apotheosis of “given data” that informs «economics» 
today. First, I will first recapitulate the aporias in the theories of value of the 
classics to show how Marx developed the original labour theory of value. Second, 
the demand of “presuppositionlessness” and the “proof” of the LTV that has 
(mis)informed approaches in Marxian value recently, will be critically targeted.
Keywords: Marx’s Method in Capital; Labour Theory of Value; (Presupposition in) 
Hegel’s Science of Logic; Adam Smith; David Ricardo.
1. Introduction: The Proof is in the Pudding
Marx’s method in Capital belongs to the most researched and simultaneou-
sly most obscure topics in present-day Marxian scholarship worldwide. This 
is all the more strange since a simple look at the full title of the great Trie-
ran’s magnus opus – Capital. A Critique of Political Economy – could provide 
a useful hint at Marx’s method. Yet, bizarrely, many authors elaborating on 
Marx’s central theorems or “dialectical method” forget that Capital was, 
first and foremost, a comprehensive critique of conventional political eco-
nomy as a science, and thus, for Marx, «without question the most terrible 
University of Zurich (elena.lange@aoi.uzh.ch)
*  A version of this essay forms the introductory chapter of my forthcoming mono-
graph Value without Fetish. Uno Kōzō’s Theory of Pure Capitalism in Light of Marx’s Critique 
of Political Economy, Historical Materialism series, Leiden: Brill, 2019.
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MISSILE that has yet been hurled at the heads of the bourgeoisie (landow-
ners included)» (Marx 1987a, 358)1. Arguably, even more bizarre in this 
context is the omission of Capital’s full title in translations. For example, 
in the conventional Japanese translation of Capital (published by Iwanami 
in 9 volumes)2, but also the Chinese, Korean and Thai translations, the 
full title is missing3. We never hear that, indeed, Marx’s first and foremost 
intention was to criticise the political economic ideas of his time. Why then 
should we proceed to make up for this lacuna by choosing such a scanda-
lously trivial title – The Proof is in the Pudding – to describe something as 
theoretically elaborate as Marx’s Critique of Political Economy?
It is worth to take a step back here: to say «the proof is in the pudding», 
is, strictly speaking, not correct. The original proverb says: «The proof of 
the pudding is in eating it». According to the Cambridge Dictionary, it 
trivially means that you can only «judge the quality of something after you 
have tried, used, or experienced it»4. For the present context, our investi-
gation into Marx’s critical method, this proverbial wisdom provides a very 
useful insight. Because if we assume that Marx had developed a method-
ological tool for revealing political economy’s blind spots and failures, then 
by necessity it starts from the presupposition of this very tool. It is a specific 
theoretical inquiry that constitutes it this analytical tool and therefore also 
demarcating the novelty of Marx’s approach: what is the social form labour 
assumes under specifically capitalist relations of production? By defining 
the substance of value as the specifically social form of labour, i.e. ab-
stract labour, and socially necessary labour time in the average as defining 
its magnitude, Marx was the first to have established a consistent, social, 
and consistently social labour theory of value in the history of economic 
thought. One of the assignments of this essay is to show how the theoret-
ical formation of the labour theory of value resulted from Marx’s critique 
of the value-theoretical elaborations of his predecessors.
The novelty of Marx’s approach is however not exhausted in making the 
social form of labour the object of inquiry. It also asks why the specific form 
1  Marx in a letter to Johann Phillip Becker, April 17th, 1867. Capitals in the original.
2  Translated by Sakisaka Itsurō and first published in 1969. 
3  We could only confirm that the full title is not translated in the standard transla-
tion in these languages, while the translations in the Roman and Slavic languages, as well 
as the standard Farsi translation, includes the subtitle. We think that a general survey on 
the state of the worldwide translations of the full title of Capital could serve as an indi-
cator of how the work has been received in the different cultural traditions. (Hindi: will 
get answer today?)
4  https://dictionary.cambridge.org/de/worterbuch/englisch/proof-of-the-pudding-
is-in-the-eating. Oct. 23rd, 2018.
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of labour, as an object of study, evades the theoretical endeavours of the clas-
sics. This of course concerns the problem of the fetishisms of the bourgeois 
relations of production the political economists, their “interpreters”, are en-
tangled in. Briefly put: Marx thinks this problem in terms of substance and 
form. Because the specificity of abstract labour as the substance of value for 
Marx consists in the fact that it by necessity hinges on a specific form of its 
appearance – namely the value forms of the «commodity», «money», «capi-
tal», «wage», «profit», «price», «interest» and «rent», categories that comprise 
the “science” of political economy – it is always systematically obfuscated 
from the minds of the economists. Yet, it is precisely this phenomenological 
state of things – that the essence or substance itself cannot appear but in 
an inverted, distorting, and altogether spurious form – that goes unnoticed in 
the elaborations of classical political economy (not to speak of neoclassical 
theories after the demise of the Ricardian School). In other words, before 
Marx, the science of political economy was solely concerned with the forms 
of value as value’s mere appearance – without giving a thought to the spe-
cific substance, i.e. the general social form of labour, that gives rise to these 
categories at all. Indeed, without giving any thought to an “epistemological 
cleft” between the appearance and the essence of specific value forms at all, 
the classics had to remain on a level of abstraction that has to tautologically 
resort to explaining form by form itself. 
The common grounding nexus (Begründungszusammenhang) of the 
seemingly disparate categories of political economy in the specific social 
form of labour is the novelty of Marx’s approach. This we can call Marx’s 
“pudding”, the central claim linking method and object in the study of 
political economy. The crucial insight into the presupposition of the la-
bour theory of value however lies in the method of its proof, i.e. in the very 
process of the critical analysis of the categories and contentions of political 
economy: in “eating the pudding”. In other words: the “proof” of the 
“pudding” – the labour theory of value – is in “eating it”, i.e. reviewing the 
contentions, convulsions and conventions of the theoretical interpreters 
of the bourgeois relations of production, the political economists, at every 
level of the unfolding of their categories. The “eating of the pudding” is 
therefore precisely the critique of political economy, for which Marx’s la-
bour theory of value re-enacts the process of its own proof. In other words, 
it cannot be proven without the process of its own implementation that 
must pass through the totality of capitalist social relations and its con-
ventional interpretation. To therefore demand the labour theory of value 
should be proven without “eating the pudding”, i.e., without criticizing 
political economy, is absurd.
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Yet, this is what many present-day Marxian commentators believe is the 
only correct method. This essay will therefore not only consider the status 
of Marx’s critique, but evaluate claims in present-day Marxian value the-
oretical scholarship that Marx’s method should be presuppositionless, that 
it should start from an «absolute beginning without imposed conditions» 
(Arthur 2004, 158). In effect, this line of Marx scholarship demands to 
prove the pudding without eating it. This new dogma of a “presupposi-
tionless” beginning, requiring to start with the mere “forms”, instead lends 
itself to the fetishistic convulsions Marx precisely set out to dismantle. 
Attacks against the labour theory of value Marx presents right at the 
beginning of Capital, as the “positing of the presupposition”, have been 
abound in the last decades of Marx scholarship. Recently, David Harvey 
claimed Marx had “refused” the labour theory of value which Harvey con-
tends is a Ricardian, not a Marxian, topic (cf. Harvey 2018). This amounts 
to saying Marx had “refused” his own intervention against Ricardo. As we 
will see soon, neither Smith, nor Ricardo in fact had developed a consis-
tent labour theory of value at all. In the same vein, this essay will show that 
we can bury Marx’s insights for good if we don’t take the specificity of his 
labour theory of value seriously – precisely because, by unfolding its own 
presupposition at every level of the analysis, it delivers a critical informa-
tive content with regard to the categories of political economy it criticises. 
In other words, the proof of the labour theory of value is the work or the 
labour of the analysis of capital itself. This is why we have to eat the pud-
ding in order to prove it.
To understand the specificity of Marx’s intervention, I will first give 
an overview of the theoretical formation of the labour theory of value by 
Marx’s critique of the value-theoretical aporias of classical political econ-
omy, notably Adam Smith and David Ricardo, in 2. Smith’s and Ricardo’s 
Aporia and the Birth of Marx’s Value Theory as Critique. Marx’s labour the-
ory of value therefore by necessity results from the presupposition of its 
own intellectual context. Second, in 3. The Illusion of Presuppositionlessness, 
I will briefly present the claims of recent Marxian scholarship that Marx’s 
method was insufficiently rigorous in presenting a “presuppositionless” 
theory of value, i.e. without relation to (abstract) labour, and criticise it. 
Finally, in 4. The Anti-Dogmatism of Marx’s Method, I will demonstrate 
why only with the nexus of the unfolding of its presupposition through 
the critique of political economy, Marx’s method is anti-dogmatic, i.e. crit-
ical, and how the negligence of this crucial aspect leads to recent schol-
arship’s «fetishisations of appearance» quite similar to the ones Marx has 
thoroughly criticised.
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2. Smith’s and Ricardo’s Aporia and the Birth of Marx’s Value 
Theory as Critique
Of all the classical economists, Adam Smith and David Ricardo – along 
with William Petty and Benjamin Franklin5 – were the most revered, but 
also the ones most elaborately criticised by Marx. The praise they received 
was owed to their attempts to systematically link a (albeit vague) concept 
of «value» to an (equally vague) concept of «labour». The criticism was 
owed to their respective failures to be consistent in doing so. This, for Marx, 
was not a mystery, but accounted for in Smiths and Ricardo’s «bourgeois 
consciousness» (Marx 1976, 175) that is oblivious to the analysis of the 
social form of labour, predominantly in the form of money and capital, 
i.e. the form of appropriation of alien labour without an equivalent, ne-
cessitated by these forms. In fact, as we will see, because of their failure to 
consequently establish the link between a social form of wealth and the 
labour that produces it, neither Smith nor Ricardo can be said to have had 
any consistent labour theory of value at all6. This is especially true for Ri-
cardo who never proposed an “embodied labour” or “substantialist” theory 
of value, but was interested solely in cost and production prices (in Marx’s 
terminology) from the offset of his theory. Ricardo’s investigation hence 
only revolved around magnitudes of «relative values». In their respective 
theories of value, therefore, precisely because they disengaged their discussions 
from a coherent and unified ground of value in social labour, they resorted to 
aporia, exemplified, as I will show, in their tautologies to explain labour va-
lues through the «value of labour» (Smith), or in their circular production 
price-determined understanding of value (Ricardo), that effectively led to 
the collapse of a meaningful link between value and the labour that pro-
duces it. Their endeavors finally resorted to explaining the economic form 
of capitalism based on the theoretical framework of the circulation, not 
the production sphere. What is more, the claim that Marx’s labour theory 
of value is merely to be regarded as a «Classical residue in Marx’s value 
theory» (Itoh 1976, 312)7, a myth that haunts Marxologist debates even 
5  For a discussion of Marx’s reception of Petty and Franklin in light of the new 
MEGA, see Hoff (2010).
6  If it can be shown that neither had a consistent labour theory of value, one may 
also argue that they had none to speak of in the first place. A good theory generally is a 
consistent theory.
7  This view was arguably inherited from Itoh’s teacher Uno (1973, 158): «[…] by 
directly developing the labour theory of value, the historical viewpoint formally estab-
lished for the first time by Marx, falls back into the ‘failings’ of classical political economy 
and cannot even escape its dangers». The same argument is made by Arthur (2006, 10): 
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today, must be abandoned: not only on the basis of showing that Marx’s 
theory was «social» and «historically specific» while Smith’s and Ricardo’s 
were not, but on the basis of showing that Smith and Ricardo, in contrast 
to Marx, ultimately did not hold a labour theory of value at all. The same 
is true for Marx’s concept of «abstract labour» as «the particular form whi-
ch labour assumes as the substance of value» (Marx 1989, 399) that the 
classics had no notion of. Hence, authors that claim Marx’s concept of the 
«substance of value» in abstract labour or the labour theory of value were 
altogether «derived» (Reuten 1993, 89) from classical political economy, 
are shown to be wrong. This is all the more the case as, curiously, none of 
these interpreters engages with the “classics” at all, which makes the thesis 
of the «classical residue» even more strange.
This section will demonstrate Smith’s and Ricardo’s «circle of reasoning 
(Begründungszirkel)» (Brentel 1989, 64) in their respective theories of val-
ue, in all brevity. Only Marx, as I will show, had a consistent, social, and a 
consistently social labour theory of value, a theory taking its vantage point 
from the «double character» of the labour represented in the commodity, a 
theory that, in the concept of «abstract labour» as the specific social form 
of value, gives coherence to both his critique of the “classics” as well as his 
analysis of the capitalist mode of production.
2.1. Conflicting Conceptualisations of Value in “The Wealth of Na-
tions (1776)”
Already in the Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Smith was concerned 
with an objective measure of value more profound than the notion of «uti-
lity», positioning himself against David Hume. Nevertheless, the “new” 
principle of value he determines as «the machine or economy by means 
of which [the harmonious movement of the system] is produced» (Smith 
2004, 216), and therefore the concept of «productive activity», is deri-
ved from a strong subjectivist-ethical criterion, namely «approbation». Yet, 
Smith was the first to move economic theory away from a «use value»-cen-
tered standpoint to a theory linking «productive activity» with value.
In The Wealth of Nations (1776), Smith undertakes three considerable 
modifications of his earlier subjectivist-ethical qualification as labour as 
«[…] the introduction by Marx of a posited ground for labour before the form of value 
is fully theorised represents a residue of classical political economy» and Reuten (1993, 
89): «[Marx’s] linking it [the ‘metaphor substance of value’] to embodiment seems to derive 
from classical political economy».
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the sole standard for value. Here, next to a theory of the «toil of labour»8, 
he holds a theory of «relative prices» (of which more below), from which 
follows a «component parts»-theory of value. Ricardo will later resort to 
considerable modifications as well, but in a different vein. To understand 
Ricardo’s and Marx’s critique of Smith, let us first look at the problems in 
Smith conceptualisations. 
Early in The Wealth of Nations, Smith draws a close relation between the 
value of a good or produce, and the labour time necessary to produce it:
In that early and rude state of society which precedes both the accu-
mulation of stock and the appropriation of land, the proportion between 
the quantities of labour necessary for acquiring different objects seems to 
be the only circumstance which can afford any rule for exchanging them 
for one another. If among a nation of hunters, for example, it usually costs 
twice the labour to kill a beaver which it does to kill a deer, one beaver 
should naturally exchange for or be worth two deer. It is natural that what 
is usually the produce of two days or two hours labour, should be worth 
double of what is usually the produce of one day’s or one hour’s labour (see 
Smith 1846, 21-22).
But this relation is only valid in an “early and rude state of society”, a 
pre-capitalist society. For Smith, it was only before «the accumulation of 
stock and the appropriation of land» that «labour», measured in expenses 
(time), could meaningfully yield the standard of the proportions in which 
«different objects» could be exchanged for another. But this is not the 
conceptualisation of value Smith has in mind for the liberal-bourgeois 
society he investigates. In it, the concept of «value», and therefore the rela-
tion between «labour» and «value», becomes dramatically different:
Every man is rich or poor according to the degree in which he can 
afford to enjoy the necessaries, conveniences, and amusements of human 
life. But after the division of labour has once thoroughly taken place, it is 
but a very small part of these with which a man’s own labour can supply 
him. The far greater part of them he must derive from the labour of other 
people, and he must be rich or poor according to the quantity of that la-
bour which he can command, or which he can afford to purchase.
The value of any commodity, therefore, to the person who possesses it, and 
who means not to use or consume it himself, but to exchange it for other com-
8  «The real price of every thing, what every thing really costs to the man who wants 
to acquire it, is the toil and trouble of acquiring it. What every thing is really worth to 
the man who has acquired it, and who wants to dispose of it or exchange it for something 
else, is the toil and trouble which it can save to himself, and which it can impose upon 
other people. What is bought with money or with goods is purchased by labour, as much 
as what we acquire by the toil of our own body» (Smith 1846, 13).
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modities, is equal to the quantity of labour which it enables him to purchase or 
command. Labour, therefore, is the real measure of the exchangeable value 
of all commodities (cf. Smith 1846, 13).
In bourgeois society, the value of commodities is no longer measured in 
the labour expenses objectified in the commodities, but in «labour com-
manded», in the quantity of labour which can purchase or «command» 
a commodity. And this is an entirely different thing than to say that the 
value of a commodity consists in the labour «that it costs»: for now, it is the 
value of labour someone can command, and not labour values, that govern 
exchange relations. Marx sees Smith’s tautology in the fact that Smith does 
not consistently follow the concept of the «quantity of labour» as the im-
manent measure of value in units of time contained in a commodity and 
instead takes refuge in a concept of «the value of labour» which already con-
tains a value-determined quantity. As wage labour, «labour» (labour power 
as a commodity) has value. But in consequence, it cannot itself determine 
value: «The value of labour, or rather of labour capacity, changes, like that 
of any other commodity, and is in no way specifically different from the 
value of other commodities. Here value is made the measuring rod and the 
basis for the explanation of value – so we have a cercle vicieux» (Marx 1988, 
378). As a general logical prerequisite, it is obvious that what accounts for 
an «entity» must be of a different category and quality than the entity itself. 
In the view of Helmut Brentel, we are here confronted with the «circle of 
reasoning in classical theories of value» (Brentel 1989, 64), but we will see 
that present-day Marxologists stick to the same illogical schema.
Needless to say, for Marx, Smith’s original conception of value as «la-
bour commanded» (= the value of labour) is not only tautological, but 
anachronistic. Smith’s peculiar inversion of historical relations consists in 
that, on the one hand, he assumes an objective theory of labour values 
in social relations in which the conditions for production and reproduc-
tion have not yet been subsumed under «objective» exchange relations, i.e. 
exchange relations governed by social labour as the sole measure of value – 
but as soon as he describes capitalist relations, this determination no longer 
holds. Under capitalist relations, in which the «produce of labour does not 
always belong to the labourer» therefore, Smith merely assumes produc-
tion prices, that must «yield», i.e. substitute «the profits of the stock which 
advanced the wages and furnished the materials of that labour», invested 
by the «owner of the stock» (Smith 1846, 23). Accordingly, we find here a 
further specification of his «labour commanded» theory of value:
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The real value of all the different component parts of price, it must be observed, 
is measured by the quantity of labour which they can, each of them, purchase or 
command. Labour measures the value not only of that part of price which resolves 
itself into labour, but of that which resolves itself into rent, and of that which resolves 
itself into profit. (Smith 1846, 23)
In every society the price of every commodity finally resolves itself into someone 
or other, or all of those three parts; and in every improved society, all the three enter 
more or less, as component parts, into the price of the far greater part of commodi-
ties. (Smith 1846, 23)
Wages, profit, and rent, are the three original sources of all revenue as well as of 
all exchangeable value. (Smith 1846, 24)
The reason is that Smith «goes positively mad (es ihn förmlich irremacht)» 
(Marx 1956, 53) over the problem of the exchange between capital and la-
bour as a mere exchange of equivalents. Something else aside an exchange 
of equivalents – an exchange of labour with the products it «buys» – is 
happening here. Smith senses, although he cannot account for the reasons, 
that the law of value is transformed into a law of appropriation:
[Smith] senses that somehow – whatever the cause may be, and he does not 
grasp what it is – in the actual result the law is suspended: more labour is exchanged 
for less labour (from the labourer’s standpoint), less labour is exchanged for more 
labour (from the capitalist’s standpoint) […]. It obviously perplexes him... that when 
the conditions of labour assume an independent existence over and against labour 
itself – something new occurs, apparently (and actually in the result) the law of value 
changes into its opposite. (Marx 1988a, 393)
It is this very circumstance, this confrontation with an antinomy – how 
the exchange between capital and labour can be explained on the basis 
of the exchange of equivalents – that induced Smith to modify his initial 
value theory, away from a theory of labour objectified towards a theory of 
labour commanded that is itself wanting of an explanation and caught up 
in circular reasoning.
This further specification is, again, tautological: because allegedly, under 
capitalist relations, an explanation of «price» based on labour values seems 
no longer possible, Smith holds the view that the «price or exchangeable 
value» of a commodity must be resolved into price-constituents: wages, 
profits, rent. Again, we are confronted with the tautology that the expla-
nans is already contained in the explanandum; price is explained by price. 
In both cases of circular reasoning, the theory of value is dissolved into a 
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theory of relative price that already encompasses the market and presuppos-
es a general rate of profit. It thereby resorts to the explanatory framework 
of the circulation sphere; yet another inconsistency with regard to the ini-
tial claim. In consequence, Smith’s conceptualisation of «natural price», 
resolving into (the price) of labour, capital and land (i.e. wages, profit, and 
rent), has given the incentive to the (Sayian) theory of the «factors of pro-
duction» – the «Trinity Formula» in Marx’s dictum – that no longer sees 
«labour» as the source of value. The necessary unity of the substance and the 
measure of value given in Marx’s labour theory of value therefore remains 
completely unreflected in Smith’s theory. To the contrary: Smith abandons 
his initial determination of an immanent measure of value for an external 
measure of value in a theory of «relative price». Accordingly, by abstaining 
from a reflection of inner coherence and sticking to the phenomenal form 
of price, Smith (and Ricardo) were unable to develop a theory of value 
forms as the qualitative theory of the determination of money and price.
2.2. Ricardo’s Conceptual Confusions 
Ricardo’s improvement in value theory as against Smith’s concept of «va-
lue» as «labour commanded» or the value of labour is obvious from the 
very first line of his Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817):
The value of a commodity, or the quantity of any other commodity for which 
it will exchange, depends on the relative quantity of labour which is necessary for its 
production, and not on the greater or less compensation which is paid for that labour. 
(Ricardo 1969, 5)9
This indeed seems closer to Marx’s view. But other than Smith whose 
main aporia is owed to an anachronistic view of capitalist society, the pre-
cariousness of Ricardo’s theory is owed to missing conceptual differentia-
tions resulting from a conflation of different levels of abstraction. From the 
start, Ricardo identifies concrete and abstract labour (all labour is concrete 
labour), labour and labour power, surplus value and profit, and – following 
from his inability to understand the specificities of value-creating labour 
in the production process – constant and variable capital. Instead, Ricardo 
merely differentiates between «fixed» and «circulating» capital, «different 
forms arising out of the process of the circulation of capital» (Marx 1989, 
401) – which effectively leads to Ricardo’s failure to explain the emergence 
9  Marx praises Ricardo as having thus established «a unified theoretical holistic view 
of the abstract general basis of the bourgeois system» (Marx 1956, 54; own translation).
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of a uniform rate of profit on the basis of his own value theory. The con-
flations of these terms can be deduced to Ricardo’s incomprehension of 
1) the specificity of value- and surplus value producing labour in the pro-
duction process, measured in a variable working day10, i.e. in wages which 
represent necessary labour as against surplus labour, and whose quantitative 
difference is the source of surplus value and, in deduced form, profit, 2) in 
consequence, the unequal exchange between capital and labour. All in all, 
Marx’s accusation of a «lack of the power of abstraction» weighs heavy on 
Ricardo’s economic theory. This becomes obvious right at the beginning 
of Ricardo’s analysis where the rate of profit is “smuggled in” – without a 
previous explanation of the basis of profit in the first place. For it is entirely 
unclear how, from Ricardo’s concept of «value» – depending on «the rela-
tive quantity of labour which is necessary for its production» – we should 
come to profit at all:
All Ricardo’s illustrations only serve him as a means to smuggle in the presuppo-
sition of a general rate of profit. And this happens in the first chapter On Value, while 
WAGES are supposed to be dealt with only in the 5th chapter and profits in the 6th. 
How from the mere determination of the ‘value’ of the commodities their surplus 
value, the profit and even a general rate of profit are derived remains obscure with 
Ricardo. IN FACT the only thing which he proves in the above illustrations is that 
the prices of the commodities, in so far as they are determined by the general rate 
of profit, are entirely different from their values. And he arrives at this difference by 
postulating the rate of profit to be LAW. One can see that though Ricardo is accused 
of being too abstract, one would be justified in accusing him of the opposite: lack 
of the power of abstraction, inability, when dealing with the values of commodities, 
to forget profits, a FACT which confronts him as a result of competition. (Marx 
1989, 416)
The real problem, according to Marx, is that, because Ricardo already 
confuses value and production prices from the beginning of his inquiry, 
he never arrives at the analysis of value. His vantage point is belated, so 
to speak, in taking off from the superficial forms of appearance of value 
10  Ricardo’s failed attempts to find an «invariable measure of value» (see Ricardo 
1969, Section VI, 27-30) for which he had been mocked by Bailey, has its source ul-
timately in understanding the characteristic of wage labour as value productive that is 
necessarily tied to a variable measure, i.e. the working day. Ricardo instead conflates 
«invariable» with «absolute» while forgetting that an absolute measure of value – hours of 
labour expended in production – can be variable (i.e., with regard to the variable lengths 
of the working day, and the variable relations of «necessary» and «surplus labour» of 
which he had no concept).
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– «cost price»11 or (in Marx’s terminology) «production price» – to investi-
gate the effects of a rise or a fall of wages on them12. These effects are then 
naturally taken to explain the general rate of profit. But we are left with a 
non sequitur: the level wage itself is wanting of an explanation. Without a 
concept of the wage form, his concept of profit is a deus ex machina.
This problem becomes eminent when Ricardo touches upon social re-
production. Here, he repeats Smith’s tautological misconceptions to finally 
capitulate to the impasse to simultaneously determine the value of a com-
modity by the socially necessary labour time («the quantity of labour») 
needed for its production and the value of «labour» in exchange with capi-
tal. Ricardo’s inability to grasp not labour, but labour power as a commod-
ity, and therefore to grasp the function of the wage-form, leads to another 
tautology:
The power of the labourer to support himself, and the family which may be 
necessary to keep up the number of labourers, does not depend on the quantity of 
money which he may receive for wages, but on the quantity of food, necessaries, and 
conveniences become essential to him from habit, which that money will purchase. 
The natural price of labour, therefore, depends on the price of the food, necessaries, 
and conveniences required for the support of the labourer and his family. With a rise 
in the price of food and necessaries, the natural price of labour will rise; with the fall 
in their price, the natural price of labour will fall. (Ricardo 1969, 52)
Because Ricardo fails to determine the «value of labour» by the mon-
ey expression of wages – based on the labour time socially necessary for its 
reproduction, and therefore variable – but by «natural price», i.e. a fixed 
(«from habit») level of wages warranting the reproduction of the worker 
and her family, «natural price» again depends on the price of «necessaries». 
The «value of labour» as labour’s «natural price» therefore is determined by 
the use values necessary for the worker’s subsistence, expressed in price of 
means of subsistence. Ricardo completely disregards the constitutive func-
tion of the wage form – its unequal exchange with capital – which would 
require a value determination in terms of socially necessary labour time, 
i.e. value, not in terms of use value13. Ultimately, the «value of labour», an 
11  Cost prices consist of constant and variable capital and do not contain surplus 
value. Categorically, they belong to the level of production price (k + kp’). To explain 
both and how they constitute a general rate of profit, we need a consistent theory of 
surplus value. 
12  The effect of rising wages onto the different compositions of capital is the main 
theme in the First Section of The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation erroneously 
titled On Value.
13  To further complicate the matter, Ricardo determines the value of labour power 
to be equally dependent of «supply and demand» as well as the «varying price of food and 
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expression of price, is explained by price. We find the same “circular rea-
soning” that we have confronted in Smith’s determination of value by «la-
bour commanded» or by the «value of labour» which itself is wanting of an 
explanation. Because both authors do not comprehend the necessity of a 
concept of the substance of value, in which both the quality and the quantity 
of that value is grounded – a concept of «absolute value», ultimately, which 
first of all explains relative values – they could not escape the tautological 
character of their explanatory framework. What is more, in their explan-
atory framework, they remain on the level of appearance, of production 
price, and therefore resort to the sphere of circulation.
But again, Ricardo’s basic methodological predicament, namely the 
conflation of different levels of abstraction, accounts for Ricardo’s “modi-
fied”, and for Marx hence inconsequential labour theory of value14. While 
for Marx, all of the phenomena Ricardo describes can be traced back to a 
consistent ground in the specific social form of labour, the basis of which 
both explains different individual rates of profit as well as the emergence 
of a general rate of profit as a “transformed”, and hence already mystified 
and fetishised form of surplus value, Ricardo takes refuge in the assumption 
of the necessity of “modifications” already in the basic theory of value – 
owed to the missing conceptual distinctions between «value» and «cost 
price» and ultimately, «price of production» and (relative) value, delegating 
the existence of value/price to the sphere of exchange (market), and not 
to the sphere of production. Ricardo therefore, like Smith before him, 
fails in consequentially explaining the existence of a social coherence in 
labour-based value.
From the previous, we could not only detect the aporia in Smith’s and 
Ricardo’s theories of value, and their ultimate inability to explain the ex-
change of capital and labour on the basis of the formal validity of equiv-
alent exchange. We could also see – reconstructing Marx’s immanent cri-
tique of both positions – in what respect Marx was eager to distinguish 
his own value theory from theirs: in a concept of the substance of value in 
abstract-homogenous, i.e. value producing labour, measured in «socially 
necessary labour time». This concept allows for the unity of both the qual-
ity (the social form) and quantity (the magnitude) of value, and therefore 
other necessaries» (Ricardo 1969, 8), further removing the concept of «value» from the 
initial definition (and thereby provoking the mockery of J.B. Say). 
14  Because Ricardo assumed that the coincidence of labour values and production 
price were the rule, and not the exception to the rule, i.e. conflated both from the begin-
ning, Heinrich (1999, 54-55) argues that Marx should have portrayed Ricardo as an 
«inconsequential theorist of production price», not an inconsequential theorist of labour 
values. For a detailed discussion of Marx’s reception of Ricardo, see Hoff (2004).
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presents the intrinsic measure to the superficial and fetishised forms of val-
ue (natural price, relative value, etc.) that Smith and Ricardo ultimately 
resorted to. Marx’s Social Labour Theory of Value has therefore emerged as 
the only consequential «labour theory of value» against the background of 
this critique.
3. The Illusion of ‘Presuppositionlessness’
Authors of the Marxian tradition critically dealing with Marx’s labour the-
ory of value have however not only disregarded the break with the clas-
sical conception of «value» that constituted Marx’s Critique of Political 
Economy in the first place. They have also been oblivious to the specific 
critical function of the differentiation between abstract and concrete labour 
and the succeeding value form analysis conducted in the first Chapter of 
Capital, namely as being a critique of the fetishism of simple circulation 
and its semblance, and, hence, their incomprehension of the specificity of 
money. As a consequence, they do not just misunderstand the specific use 
of crucial terms like (value) form, but fail to recognise Marx’s method as an 
evolving critique of the fetishistic categories of classical political economy, 
a method which must start from the assumption of the totality of the so-
cial form of labour that provides the coherence and the obfuscated ground of 
the value forms (of money, capital, etc.).
This section will critically deal with the criticisms of Marx’s method and 
the offered alternative assumptions, focusing on the call for the necessity of 
an “unmediated” or “presuppositionless” beginning of the exposition. For 
reasons of space, we should look at the arguments which to discuss and 
refute in detail would require a much longer essay, in all brevity.
3.1. An ‘absolute beginning’?
Chris Arthur for example thinks that Marx was unjustified in introducing 
the concept of «(abstract) labour» prematurely:
It is notorious that Marx dives down from the phenomena of exchange value to 
labour as the substance of value in the first three pages of Capital and people rightly 
complain they do not find any proof there. So I argue […] that we must first study 
the development of the value form and only address the labour content when the 
dialectic of the forms itself requires us to do so. (Arthur 2004, 12)  
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Arthur (2004, 158) insists that for the analysis of the capital, «an ab-
solute beginning without imposed conditions is needed». We will argue that 
such a claim cannot be accepted since it misrepresents the critical character 
of Marx’s own method.
Geert Reuten (2005, 78-92) sings the same tune when he claims the 
value form of money as a «constituent of value» – and therefore begs the 
question, because we want to know precisely why it is that money rep-
resents value, why money can indeed buy all the other commodities. 
In the same vein, the Marxist theorist of money and finance, Costas 
Lapavitsas and Itoh Makoto of the Uno School see no reason to have to 
refer to abstract labour at all when they try to explain how money becomes 
the universal equivalent of exchange (see Lapavitsas 2005 and 2017 and 
Itoh 1976)15 Especially Itoh entangles himself in circularity and truisms 
when he tries to explain the money form without recourse to abstract hu-
man labour:
Marx does not regard the common property of commodities only as the embo-
diment of abstract human labor. He emphasises that ‘commodities have a value-form 
common to them all, and presenting a marked contrast with the varied bodily forms 
of their use-values’. […] he means here the money-form or the price-form of commo-
dities as the completed form of value, logically developed from the simple, elemen-
tary form of value. (Itoh 1976, 310) 
Not much is being said here except for the truism that the money-form 
is developed from the simple form of value. The question is what constitu-
tes the simple form of value from which the money-form, the “dazzling fe-
tish”, can be developed at all. Marx himself has time and again pointed to 
the fact that commodities of different use values are already presupposed as 
values when they are exchanged for the universal equivalent16. What posits 
15  For a critique of Lapavitsas’s theory of «Money as a Monopolist of the Ability 
to Buy», see my article in Lange (2017). I argue that Lapavitsas presents a functionalist 
theory of money with the implication that «money is what money does» – unlike Marx 
who develops the functions of money from its being the «direct incarnation of all human 
labour» (Marx 1976, 187), i.e. money does what money is.
16  «[…] for commodities to express their exchange value independently in money, 
in a third commodity, the exclusive commodity, the values of commodities must already 
be presupposed […]. For example, if all commodities express their value in gold, then this ex-
pression in gold, their gold price, their equation with gold, is an equation on the basis of which 
it is possible to elucidate and compute their value relation to one another, for they are now 
expressed as different quantities of gold and in this way the commodities are represented in 
their prices, as comparable magnitudes of the same common denominator. But in order to 
be represented in this way, the commodities must already be identical as values» (Marx 1989, 
321; emphasis added).
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them equal as values is the abstract human labour contained in them. Only 
by virtue of being equal as values, as containing abstract human labour, 
they can be measured against money, the universal equivalent representing 
that labour, at all. This is the classical tertium problem that Marx hinted at 
with his analysis of the value form. It doesn’t make sense to compare foxes 
and the letter «Y». There is no aspect they have in common on the grounds 
of which they can be meaningfully compared to one another. They miss 
a common quality. A quantitative comparison already indicates that they 
have been tacitly equated to one another, that their equality with regard 
to something is presupposed. In commodities, it is their value-forming sub-
stance, abstract human labour.
Regarding the analysis of the value form, two crucial interventions 
Marx aimed at go completely unnoticed (or even rejected) by the authors 
quoted above: (I) the necessity of presupposing the totality of the capital 
relation from the beginning, in which the category of the «commodity» 
with which the analysis starts by no means signifies the «simplest», but 
the most complex determination, a «relation of totality»17, and (II) the func-
tion of value-form analysis as deriving the fetishistic semblance of simple 
circulation from the development of the commodity into money in their 
common ground of abstract labour. By refusing to see the critical intent 
already inherent in Marx’s very first, allegedly “innocuous” analysis – that 
of the commodity – the commentators mentioned above lend themselves 
to a pre-critical understanding of Marx’s method.
3.2. The Forensic Investigation of Political Economy: Presupposing 
Totality
The reason for the pre-critical predicament of some approaches in value 
form theory hence lies in the ignorance of the fact that already at the stage 
of value form analysis, the totality of capital – the «whole system of bourgeois 
production» (Marx 1987b, 466) – is presupposed: the exchange between 
20 yards of linen and one coat does not denote a «simple exchange», but 
the most abstract sphere of bourgeois self-presentation. Consequently, the 
real and by no means simple requirements which always already have to be 
17  «Totalitätsverhältnis» (Brentel 1989, 264). Reuten (1993, 96) fails to see both 
the specific character and function of the commodity: «[…] is this, the commodity, the 
most abstract all-embracing concept for the capitalist mode of production? I doubt it. For 
example, does it embrace in itself a notion of the activity of creation of useful objects in 
capitalist form?». That, in fact, it does, seems to escape Reuten’s comprehension, which is 
a consequence of his failure to understand Marx’s method as such. 
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fulfilled, so that simple circulation can appear as the paradigmatic form of 
capitalist intercourse, and exchange value can appear as a simple, presuppo-
sitionless economic form, do not immediately present themselves «from an 
examination of the simple circulation», but «lie behind it as economic rela-
tions enclosed in the division of labour» (Marx 1987b, 467). Like investors 
in a criminal case, we must therefore reconstruct the sphere of simple cir-
culation from what lies behind it. What is “forgotten” in the examination 
of simple circulation, on the one hand, is the «objective basis of the whole 
system of production», that it is not autonomous individuals who meet 
«on the market» to exchange their respective goods, but a relation that 
«already in itself implies compulsion over the individual», in which the 
individual is «entirely determined by society; that this further presupposes 
a division of labour etc., in which the individual is already posited in re-
lations other than that of mere exchanger» (Marx 1973, 248). Mainly, the 
presentation of simple exchange as the point of departure of the analysis 
of capitalist exchange relations does itself convey a critical intent in that it 
prepares the re-examination of the formal validity of the law of equivalent 
exchange in the case of capital and wage labour. It is therefore both pre-
supposed and “overlooked” («obliterated»18) in the formal characteristics of 
simple circulation: 
What is overlooked, finally, is that already the simple forms of exchange value 
and of money latently contain the opposition between labour and capital etc. Thus, 
what all this wisdom comes down to is the attempt to stick fast to the simplest eco-
nomic relations, which, conceived by themselves, are pure abstractions; but these 
relations are, in reality, mediated by the deepest antithesis, and represent only one 
side, in which the full expression of the anti-thesis [between labour and capital] is 
obscured. (Marx 1973, 248)19
Elsewhere (see Lange 2016, 254-265), I have already shown the meth-
odological assumptions in Marx’s critique of capital owe to Hegel’s method 
of constituting the object through the inner relation of its parts at the lev-
el of the «Logic of Reflection (Reflexionslogik)». The totality presupposed 
for developing the categories from the “poorest” (being/nothingness) to 
the “richest” (the «concept»/the «idea») is therefore constitutive to the 
object, a totality understood as «overgrasping subjectivity (übergreifende 
18  «[...] from the standpoint of the simple circulation, these relationships are obliterated» 
(Marx 1987, 466).
19  The context in which the quote appears is the critique of Proudhon who is at-
tacked as a deeply «bourgeois» thinker in believing that exchange represents a «system of 
universal freedom» which has only been «perverted by money, capital, etc» (Marx 1973, 
248). 
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Subjektivität)» (Hegel 1991, 290). It must therefore begin with mere sem-
blance, with what is untrue20. This also means that the independence and 
“immediate truth” of the categories will show itself to be a wrong assump-
tion. Being and Nothingness are absolutely mediated categories that cannot 
even be meaningfully determined21 when their “purity” is assumed: taken 
in isolation, they cannot account for their own constitution. The same goes 
for the commodity and the semblance of simple circulation: we are here 
only confronted with a distorted version of truth. The deeply problematic 
truth of capital can only be elucidated as a complete critique of its constitu-
tive categories, that of political economy.
It is therefore all the more strange that Marxist authors claim that Hegel 
started from the premise of presuppositionlessness22. The contrary is true: 
Hegel’s, like Marx’s presentation, development of the idea deliberately 
starts from a completely mediated nexus that, in the beginning, must show 
itself to be wrong precisely by taking the categories in isolation, without pre-
supposition, in the manner of «outer reflection». One must even concede 
that in the bourgeois economists, like the philosophers Hegel criticised 
(we must of course think of Kant), precisely because their own categories 
were conceptualised as unrelated, they were contradictory. 
We must here return to the question of form. In the introductory sec-
tion, we have already sketched the function of form analysis as the specific 
method that reveals the obliterated genetic construction of the conven-
tional categories (or «forms»), i.e. money, capital, wage, profit, rent, etc., 
in their form. Marx’s impetus is indeed very Hegelian: his concept of «form» 
coincides with Hegel’s concept of the «concept», namely in that it resolutely 
rejects a mere “formal” understanding of form. The concept of «overgrasp-
ing subjectivity (mediation)» entails a concept of «form» as form-content 
20  «At this point, we could at once raise the question why, if that is the case, we 
should begin with what is untrue and why we do not straightaway begin with what is true. 
The answer is that the truth must, precisely as such, validate itself [muss sich bewähren], 
and here, within logical thinking itself, validation consists in the Concept’s showing itself 
to be what is mediated through and with itself, so that it shows itself to be at the s a m e 
time the genuinely immediate» (Hegel 1991, 134).
21  This has to do with the semantic-pragmatic surplus meaning/cleft necessary for 
the dialectical presentation. For more details, see Lange (2016).
22  The matter is complicated by the fact that there are supporters (Arthur, Reuten) 
and opponents (Murray) of Hegel’s alleged “presuppositionlessness”, but the claim itself 
is never doubted. Murray (2000, 38 e.g.) says: «Marx does not leave the circle of Hege-
lian systematic dialectics unbroken; he objects to the ‘presuppositionlessness’ of Hegelian 
systematic dialectics and insists that science has premises, which he and Engels sketched 
in The German Ideology». But at the time of The German Ideology, Marx has not yet de-
veloped a theory of value at all! This early work is set within a radically different method-
ological framework and has different objectives than Marx’s later, economy-critical work. 
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(Formgehalt) which no longer stands in opposition to the content or «sub-
stance» it designates. The object of investigation (the social form of labour 
that generates the capital-relation) is given as a processual total structure 
of economic forms and changes of form (Formwechsel) whose «inner cord» 
(Marx 2008, 27) presents a universal common to all the individual forms, 
as an “overgrasping” relation. This is no easy task: because the form deter-
minations only exist as moments of the total nexus, Marx – and we, as his 
readers – must position ourselves as the criminal investigators of political 
economy who reconstruct the nexus from its mere (and sometimes out-
right inverted) appearance.
4. The Anti-Dogmatism of Marx’s Method: Eating the Pudding 
(in Fact)
From the previous it should also be clear that the necessity of presupposing 
the totality that constitutes capitalist relations of production, which makes 
«simple exchange» appear as the paradigmatic form of economic intercour-
se, serves a critical, i.e. anti-dogmatic function. Eating the pudding, i.e. “te-
sting” the claims of its object of its critique (political economy as a science) 
towards their own hidden presuppositions, is therefore inherently critical. 
This must however not be confused with a petitio principii. As Hegelian 
scholar and physicist Dieter Wandschneider has shown, the logical presup-
position at the beginning of Hegel’s Logic – and I would add: Marx’s Capi-
tal – is precisely not a petitio principii, because in contrast to this “circular” 
form of argumentation, it can account for and define its content:
It is decisive that the form of self-foundational reasoning (Selbstbegründung) [by 
which is meant that logic/arguments/thought cannot be fundamentally doubted 
except on the grounds of logic/arguments/thought itself ] is a foundation (Begründ-
ung) insofar it is not founded on arbitrary suppositions, but has a logically cogent 
character. Circular reasoning and self-foundational reasoning are not the same. 
(Wandschneider 1995, 19)
A faulty argument as that of circular reasoning (petitio principii) is pre-
cisely faulty because it does not account for itself. In contrast, the presup-
position of a nexus – the capitalist relations of production – can account 
for itself23: in Marx’s case, via the critique of their presentation in the clas-
23  Needless to say, not every argument building on the presupposition of its context 
also accounts for it. My point is to show that Marx’s and Hegel’s system do, while a petitio 
principii would inherently fail to do so.
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sics, at every level of its categorial unfolding. With regard to the neces-
sary structural and methodological presupposition of the determination 
of abstract labour as the substance of value, which again presupposes the 
totality of specific relations of class, division of labour, the separation of 
the direct producersfrom the means of production, etc., i.e., commodity 
production, Marx followed the same method as Hegel. Marx, like every 
critical thinker after Hegel, was well aware that there is no such thing 
as «presuppositionless thought (voraussetzungsloses Denken)». Like Hegel, 
Marx knew that the starting point of the exposition must always-already 
be mediated by heavily burdened conceptual presuppositions. The point 
for him was not to deny that the pivotal concepts come with pragmatic 
and semantic baggage, but on the contrary to show that the idea of a pure 
exposition necessarily falls into ideological abyss24.
This is also why Marx’s method is undogmatic: it does not hypostasise 
ready-made categories from the outset, but precisely by “borrowing” the 
categories of political economy to point to their hidden content – as Bren-
tel remarks, the commodity in Marx «is preliminarily presented in the lan-
guage of the English economists» (Brentel 1989, 281) – it simultaneously 
lays bare its object of critique as well as its own method. Marx presented 
the very first determinations, the commodity and its value, in such a way 
that its essential content – abstract labour and the determination of value 
as the socially necessary labour time needed to produce a commodity in 
the social average – would impress itself as the compelling heuristic tool or 
the analytical basis not only for the first three chapters or the middle part 
of Vol. 1, but the complete analysis of the economic laws of movement of 
modern society that Capital is comprised of. The labour theory of value 
is therefore the key heuristic tool to unravel the fetishised forms in which 
value presents itself through its own movement. It is precisely in the “lay-
ing bare” of object and method, the analytical tool of the labour theory of 
value, from the beginning of the inquiry, and proving it in the process of 
the critique, where the self-reflexive character of Marx’s critique is situated. 
As readers of Marx therefore, we should be ready to eat the pudding, even 
if it is not always easy to digest.
24  To this methodological “dialectic” Marx pointed also in the Results of the Imme-
diate Process of Production: «As the elementary form of bourgeois wealth, the commodity 
was our point of departure, the prerequisite for the emergence of capital. On the other 
hand, commodities appear now as the product of capital. […] if we consider societies 
where capitalist production is highly developed, we find that the commodity is both the 
constant elementary premiss (precondition) of capital and also the immediate result of 
the capitalist process of production» (Marx 1976, 949). Marx bases this argument on the 
historical emergence of capitalism.
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